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Abstract
This article analyses oil elite formation in light of the wider transformation that is taking place in the global 
oil order due to the rise of powers from the Global South, including Russia: in particular, the expansion 
and integration of the state-owned oil companies into the global oil market. This is done by analysing the 
networks that the directors of the world’s largest oil companies create through their affiliations with a) 
other corporations, b) policy planning bodies and c) with the state. The most important finding is that the 
increased cooperation between the Western private oil companies and the non-Western state-owned oil 
companies has not yet translated into increased integration between their respective elite networks. It is 
argued that this indicates we are witnessing a transition towards a more multi-polar global oil order that 
increasingly needs to take into account the rising powers of the Global South.
Keywords
Corporate elite networks, geopolitics of oil, Global South, interlocking directorates, social network 
analysis
Introduction
The current decade is witnessing what seems to be a transformation of the global oil order. 
Indications of this transformation are a global expansion of state-owned oil companies from the 
Global South and Russia, a resurgence of resource nationalism in various key producing regions 
across the globe, declining reserves within the key major consuming countries, exponentially 
growing demand from the so-called ‘emerging economies’ and an exceptionally high oil price. 
Another significant characteristic is the politicization of climate change. These developments have 
led to a revival of the debate – both within academics and in politics – on energy security, the 
potential for increased geopolitical rivalry over resources, a re-intensification of so-called ‘resource 
wars’, the possible dangers of oil and gas dependency, and the possible threats that the rising state-
owned energy companies might pose to the (interests of the) private oil companies and neoliberal 
market mechanisms (e.g. Bradshaw, 2009; Correljé and Van der Linde, 2006; Helm, 2005; 
Hoogeveen and Perlot, 2005; Klare, 2001; Van der Linde, 2000; Vivoda, 2009).
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The point of the departure for this article is that these developments should be seen within a 
broader shift that is currently taking place within the global political economy, that is, the much 
commented rise of economic and political powers from outside the West and the shifting gravity of 
power towards the Global South, in particular Asia.1 The broader question underlying this study is, 
therefore, to what extent and how the rise of the Southern state-owned oil companies (will) lead to 
a fundamental challenge to the power structures within the existing global oil market and its ‘rules 
of the game’. As noted above, while there are clear signs of a transformation taking place, it is still 
unclear what the precise nature of this transformation is and what the possible outcomes are.
Previous research shows that the global expansion of the Southern state-owned oil majors has 
been paralleled by their integration into the global oil market through increased joint relations and 
cooperation with the private oil majors (de Graaff, 2011). Other studies on state-owned oil compa-
nies also show evidence of what is identified as an increasing internationalization of these compa-
nies (Marcel, 2006; Stevens, 2008). All of this, I argue, testifies to a continuing transnationalization 
of the global oil market in spite of greater influence for state-owned oil companies. This develop-
ment points to a broader contradictory dynamic: the renewed importance of the role of the state, 
and of ‘statist capital’, within an increasingly transnational, interdependent and interconnected 
global political economy.
Within the global oil market, power is highly concentrated within a top layer consisting of rela-
tively few companies and a small number of oil elites. The directors of the world’s top 10 private 
oil companies collectively managed almost 1.6 trillion dollars in revenues (Energy Intelligence 
Group, 2008). In comparison, there were only seven countries in the world with a GDP exceeding 
that amount in 2008.2 More importantly, this concentration of power and accumulation of wealth 
takes place within a sector that is fundamental to the production process in general (see also 
Labban, 2008) and thus of crucial importance to the broader corporate elite community and their 
interests. Oil is moreover a ‘strategic commodity’; it is crucial to the interests of states, intimately 
related to national security, and serves as the backbone of every military apparatus in the world. 
Any challenge to the existing power structures within the global oil order is bound to have vast 
political, geopolitical and economic impact and holds the potential for substantive conflict but also 
of change. In addition, there is an ecological dimension to the current fossil fuel-based energy 
order. In that regard, this study also relates to a broader debate on opportunities and challenges of 
a transition towards an alternative, more ‘sustainable’ or ‘green’ energy order.
Yet, there is very little systematic research into the configuration of social power at the com-
manding heights of the petroleum sector. This article provides a first step towards such analyses by 
exploring the networks of social power constituted by the global oil elite, operationalized as the 
directors of the world’s largest oil companies, both state-owned oil majors from the Global South 
(including Russia) and private oil companies from the West.
The study of the impact of the rising powers from the Global South upon Western corporate 
circuits, as well as the influence of globalization on the Southern corporations and their leading 
elites, is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, there is a rapidly growing body of studies focusing on 
the Asian countries (Li et al., 2006); foreign direct investment (FDI) from the South (Buckley 
et al., 2007); state-owned enterprises and sovereign wealth funds (Cohen, 2009; Helleiner, 2009; 
Lavelle, 2008); and state-owned oil companies in particular (Marcel, 2006; Stevens, 2008; Van 
der Linde, 2000; Vivoda, 2009). However, there has been no study to date that looks at the recent 
expansion and integration of Southern corporate networks from the perspective of the corporate 
elites and elite formation.
There is, however, a wide literature on Western corporate elites and class (e.g. Domhoff, 
1967, 2009; Heemskerk, 2007; Van Apeldoorn, 2002; Van der Pijl, 1984, 1998). In particular, 
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Carroll and colleagues (Carroll, 2009; Carroll and Carson, 2003; Carroll and Fennema, 2002; 
Carroll et al., 2010) provide rigorous empirical accounts, on the basis of social network analysis, 
of global corporate networks and the conception of a ‘transnational capitalist class’ (see for the 
latter, Robinson and Harris, 2000; Sklair, 2001). These studies reveal the national and transna-
tional power structures through which a corporate elite, or class, builds consensus and exercises 
its power.3 This power is, first of all, embedded in corporate networks established by interlock-
ing directorates (e.g. Kentor and Jang, 2004) which ‘link the key centres of command within the 
corporate economy’ (Carroll, 2010: 7), but also via policy planning bodies such as think-tanks, 
research institutes, business coalitions, and non-profit organizations (e.g. Domhoff, 1967, 2009; 
Useem, 1984). The latter provide elite formation with an institutional and societal architecture 
through which they can formulate and extend their interests and preferred governance beyond 
the realm of the corporate boardrooms and into civil and political society (Carroll, 2010). At the 
transnational and global level, such bodies have a crucial role in forging consensus and coalesc-
ing interests – amalgamating into a global rule set, generally labelled ‘global governance’. In 
spite of the multilateral character of many of these bodies, they are seen by many critical schol-
ars as highly concentrated platforms of power from which a pre-dominantly Western elite, or 
‘transnational capitalist class’, secures the interests of the more transnational oriented sectors of 
capital (such as financial capital and large transnational corporations) (e.g. Gill, 1990; Peet, 
2007; Van Apeldoorn, 2002; Van der Pijl, 1998).
Within this research tradition there is, however, little empirical analysis of corporate and elite 
networks within the realm of the oil sector, neither has this been studied in light of the growing 
influence of the Global South, which Carroll and Carson (2003) still identify as the (semi-) periph-
ery. In fact, the Southern elites do – up to now – hardly appear on the radar screen of this body of 
research (see Carroll, 2010). The case selection of these studies is often based on the Global 500 
companies, which apparently still, to a large extent, excludes the Global South. While this indicates 
that in terms of a global corporate elite the West is still dominant, the development of the rising 
Southern corporate elites is still a significant phenomenon that needs to be researched.
This study, by providing empirical evidence of the nature and configuration of elite formation 
at the apex of the oil sector, and the extent to which integration between the West and the rising 
South has taken place within this domain, aims to contribute to: a) a better understanding of the 
social organization of power of the world’s leading oil elites and how that power is extended 
beyond the domain of their corporate boards into civil society and politics, and b) more insight into 
the relations between the Southern oil elites and the Western elite networks, in order to assess the 
extent to which the Southern oil elites form distinct (and perhaps rival) networks, or have inte-
grated within the Western elite networks and the power structures that they constitute.
Analysing oil elites
Elite formation does not only take place at the corporate level. This study therefore takes a some-
what different approach from what is generally the case within corporate elite studies. Whereas the 
usual starting point is a set of companies of which the interlocking directorates are analysed,4 this 
study takes the directors of the world’s largest oil companies and maps all their affiliations in the 
following domains: corporate affiliations (including financial capital), policy planning affiliations, 
and state affiliations. The point of departure hence is not so much the companies, but rather the 
‘ego networks’ of the directors in charge of them. This approach provides a more comprehensive 
insight into the networks of the oil elites: assessing not only their extent of potential corporate 
control and economic power, but also their embeddedness and influence within civil and political 
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society. Below I will elaborate on these different domains and how they are operationalized within 
this analysis, followed by a method and data section.
The corporate affiliations are analysed by looking at interlocking directorates of the oil com-
pany directors. Interlocking directorates provide elites with inter-organization ties that are ‘traces’ 
of strategic and allocative power across firms as well as ‘expressive, cultural-political relations that 
build solidarity and trust among leading corporate directors’ (Carroll, 2010: 7–8). In the literature 
on corporate elite networks and how they are transformed by globalization, the tendency towards 
increased transnational interlocking among the world’s largest corporations is generally confirmed. 
The overall conclusion is, however, that the basic structure of the elite networks are still to a large 
extent nationally or at least regionally embedded (e.g. Carroll and Fennema, 2002; Kentor and 
Jang, 2004; Nollert, 2005). Given earlier findings of growing cooperation between the Western and 
Southern oil majors, and the continuing transnationalization of the global energy market, it could 
be expected that integration at the elite level would follow. On the basis of the corporate interlocks 
it can both be assessed to what extent the oil elite networks identified in this study are still largely 
nationally organized or also increasingly transnational and to what extent integration of the 
Southern oil elites takes place at the corporate level.
Policy planning bodies have been shown to form a crucial part of the formulation and formation 
of wider business interests and strategies of corporate communities (e.g. Carroll and Carson, 2003; 
Gill, 1990; Van Apeldoorn, 2002; Van der Pijl, 1998). It is therefore proposed here that linkages to 
such bodies – which are deliberately broad and loosely defined to include a wide array of think-
tanks, business coalitions, policy planning institutes and regulatory/governance bodies – indicate 
the integration of the oil elites with a broader corporate community, in particular when these link-
ages are transnational. Connections between the Western and Southern oil elites at this level would 
be a crucial indication of integration since it would imply access of the Southern elites to the ‘heart’ 
of transnational corporate business strategy formulation and representation.
There is a clear state dimension to the global contestation over hydrocarbon resources, not 
only because states are fundamental to the process of production, but also because of the territo-
rially fixed nature of hydrocarbon resources in combination with the territorially defined global 
order of sovereign nation-states. States from the perspective of this study are seen as ‘state-
society complexes’ (Cox, 1981) structured by social relations that are rooted in an unequal dis-
tribution of economic, social and political power. With the unfolding of globalizing capitalism, 
these social relations might transcend the territorial realm of the nation state but do not make the 
latter irrelevant or redundant. On the contrary, even if the neoliberal rationale that accompanied 
the latest ‘phase’ of global capital expansion claims to be one of unrestrained market forces and 
a minimum of state intervention, the state during this process has not so much retreated as many 
have argued (e.g. Hardt and Negri, 2001) but had its role redefined. In fact, the state is funda-
mental to the very processes and interests that neoliberalism aims to promote (see also e.g. 
Harvey, 2003). Corporate elites are argued to form an important nexus in the interrelation 
between the state and the capital accumulation process. However, it is expected that there are 
considerable differences between the Western and Southern oil elites in terms of the configura-
tion of their ‘state–business relations’, not the least because in the case of the latter, the state is 
often the ultimate owner of the oil companies.
Method and data
The method that will be used to perform the analyses is social network analysis (SNA). The basic 
premise and advantage of SNA is that instead of focusing on the units of the system and comparing 
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their attributes it focuses on the (social) relations amongst those units (Scott, 1991a; Wasserman 
and Faust, 1994). In that way it allows for an analysis of how individual or collective agency is 
embedded in and at the same time constructs social structure (for an extensive recent guide to 
SNA, see Scott and Carrington, 2011). Apart from enabling the visualization and analysis of social 
structure, SNA also provides some basic measures which are indicators for social power and influ-
ence (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009).5 The software programme UCINET was used to perform the 
analyses (Borgatti et al., 2002).
Since no empirical study of this kind exists yet, an original data base had to be constructed. The 
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (PIW) annual ranking was chosen as point of departure (Energy 
Intelligence Group, 2008). The PIW ranking is highly recognized and based upon operational data 
from over 130 firms; it uses six individual rankings (e.g. oil and gas reserves and production, refin-
ery capacity, product sales volumes) which are added together to determine the position of the 
firms. The PIW ranking therefore contains a fairly even mix of private and (partly) state-owned oil 
companies, which together can reasonably be assumed to make up the core of the global oil market. 
Ten oil companies from the top of this ranking were selected, including an even number of private 
oil majors from the West, which are commonly labelled ‘international oil companies’ (IOCs), and 
majority state-owned oil companies from the most important regions of the Global South in terms 
of their hydrocarbon resources (that means including Russia) – these are generally called ‘national 
oil companies’ (NOCs).6 This generated a total N of 182 executive and non-executive directors (see 
Table 1).7
Priority was given to the largest and most dominant types of Western IOCs and Southern NOCs 
because the main interest of this study is elite formation at the apex of the system and the extent of 
incorporation of the Southern oil elites into the typical Western elite circuits of power. Because of 
this focus it was decided to prioritize data collection from multiple domains in which elite forma-
tion takes place (as described above) rather than to extend the number of cases, that is, to opt for 
depth rather than breadth. If integration is found at this level then it is a crucial indicator of oil elite 
integration, because it takes place at the very top of the system. As a consequence, however, this 
excludes relatively smaller oil companies, lower in the PIW ranking, as well as the ‘hybrid’ 
Table 1. Case selection
Firm Home country Type
Saudi Aramco Saudi Arabia 100% state-owned
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) Iran 100% state-owned
ExxonMobil USA IOC
Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) Venezuela 100% state-owned
China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC)/PetroChina
China 100% state-owned
British Petroleum (BP) UK IOC
Royal Dutch Shell Netherlands/UK IOC
Chevron USA IOC
Total France IOC
Gazprom Russia  50.0023% state-owned
Total N directors 182
Total N IOCs  94
Total N NOCs  88
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examples of Western NOCs (e.g. Statoil) and of Southern IOCs (e.g. Lukoil). While it would be 
very interesting to research the latter ‘hybrid’ cases, they are clearly exceptions rather than the rule. 
In order to assess whether these exceptional cases confirm or deviate from the general pattern that 
can be found by looking at the more dominant types, however, that pattern first needs to be estab-
lished, which is why this study focuses on an analysis of the dominant types.
2007 is taken as year of measurement to make the findings compatible with earlier research on 
the companies’ corporate relations. Whereas this ‘static’ approach does not provide an analysis of 
the trajectory of integration, it does allow for an analysis of the extent of integration at a certain 
point in time. If little to no integration is found at that point in time, it seems hardly plausible to 
assume that high levels of integration would have taken place in the past and that the period prior 
to 2007 would have been one of disintegration.
Data on the members of the boards were collected first from the 2007 Annual Reports of the 
selected oil companies or their SEC filings. These biographical data were then cross-checked 
and completed with data from financial and corporate databases such as Orbis (Bureau van 
Dijk), Business Week, Hoover’s company data base, Lexis Nexis company database, and 
Fortune’s profiles. Finally, when there was no precise time indication, the annual reports of the 
found affiliated companies were screened in order to confirm the actual affiliation. This was also 
done for the affiliations with the socializing and policy planning organizations and with state 
affiliations: reports, publications and websites of those affiliations were screened and cross-
checked where possible.
Western and Southern oil elite networks
Corporate networks
First of all, in terms of board composition of the selected oil companies, of the 182 directors there 
were no cases of Southern directors sitting on the IOC boards, and only six Western directors serv-
ing on the NOC boards in 2007.8 This indicates a substantial lack of West–South integration at the 
level of oil company board composition. It also shows that although some Western directors do 
have access to Southern NOC boards, Southern directors do not yet have access to Western IOC 
boards, which implies that the Western directors have more opportunity to exert influence within 
the South, than the other way around.
Turning to the interlocking directorates it was found that of the total selection of directors 52 
percent had interlocking directorates. On the basis of the nationality of those directors it was 
calculated that 39 percent were Western directors and 13 percent were Southern directors (see 
Figure 1). In relation to the total number of oil company directors this implies that 71 percent of 
the Western directors have interlocking directorates (71 out of 100), whereas in the case of the 
Southern directors this is only 26 percent (23 out of 82). Clearly, the practice of interlocking 
directorates is, as of yet, much less of a common practice amongst the Southern oil elites than 
amongst the Western oil elites.
In order to give more insight into the particular nature of these interlocks Figures 2a and 2b give 
an overview of the transnational and national corporate ties of these interlocking directors.9
The Western interlocking directors had 241 national ties (53%) and 133 transnational ties (29%). 
In the case of the Southern interlocking directors there were 63 national ties (14%) and only 17 
transnational ties (4%). This makes clear that the oil elites in general establish more national link-
ages than transnational linkages and that this applies in particular to the Southern oil elites. 
Nonetheless, in the case of the Western oil elites, almost 30 percent of their corporate ties are made 
up of transnational linkages.
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Figure 1. Oil company directors with corporate interlocks.
Figures 2a and b. Distribution transnational-national corporate ties.
Sources: Annual reports of the connected companies, SEC filings, Orbis (Bureau van Dijk), Lexis Nexis.
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These findings show that although the oil elites are predominantly nationally connected to the 
corporate world, a subgroup of them does have a substantial number of transnational corporate ties 
and connections. In that sense, the pattern found here, at least for part of the oil elites, does seem 
to confirm the general finding in the literature of a transnational corporate ‘superstructure’ resting 
on firm nationally integrated bases (e.g. Carroll and Fennema, 2002). What this study shows in 
addition to that general finding is that the Southern oil elites are still almost exclusively nationally 
connected in terms of corporate ties: with only a few transnational corporate linkages (4%) there is 
little integration into a transnational ‘superstructure’.
Whereas these findings give insights into the accumulated number and distribution of ties of the 
directors of the selected NOCs and IOCs, it does not reveal who has ties to whom – i.e. if and how 
they are connected – and to what extent, through these ties, there is integration between the net-
works of these NOC and IOC boards. This can be done by looking at the networks that are created 
by the corporate interlocks of these oil company directors in 2007. Figure 3 shows the complete 
network of companies.10
First of all, the graph in Figure 3 makes clear that the corporate network of these oil elites con-
sists of three components. Whereas the major IOCs ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, Total, BP and 
Chevron are connected to each other, as well as to the NOCs Saudi Aramco and Gazprom, PDVSA 
(in the upper right corner) and CNPC and PetroChina (in the lower right corner) form two separate 
clusters disconnected from the main component. Components of a network are parts that are con-
nected within but disconnected between other parts of the graph. The lack of integration between 
these IOCs and NOCs is hence clearly illustrated by this graph. Whereas all the IOCs are indirectly 
connected to each other through corporate interlocks of their board members, the NOC clusters of 
Figure 3. Corporate network of the Western and Southern oil elites.
Key:  White squares: Western companies; black squares: Southern companies; node size: degree (number) of outgoing/
incoming ties; tie strength: number of ties between each pair of companies; major NOCs and IOCs are labelled.
Sources:  Annual reports of the connected companies, SEC filings, Orbis (Bureau van Dijk), Lexis Nexis.
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PDVSA and CNPC/PetroChina are entirely disconnected both from each other and from the IOC 
network. Since NIOC, the Iranian NOC, had no directors with interlocking directorates, it is not 
part of this network at all. Gazprom and Saudi Aramco, however, are two NOCs that are not iso-
lated components but are indirectly connected to the IOC network, although – as will be shown 
later – only through a few weak ties. Second, the graph illustrates a lack of integration through 
corporate interlocking between the South and the West in general. Within the Western component 
Southern companies (black squares) are hardly present, and within the Southern parts, there are 
only a few clusters of Western companies (white squares). In the network surrounding Gazprom 
there seems to be the most integration in this respect.
Now that a first broad outline of the structure of the network has been generated, the nature of 
these connections will be more closely analysed. What are the meeting places of the oil elites, what 
are the main channels of cooperation and communication, how strong are these ties and who are 
the central actors?
Figure 4 gives the two-mode network, that is, displaying both directors and companies (see note 
10 for explanation) of the main component, only including the ‘big oil linkers’ (corporate directors 
with at least three board memberships) which is a total of 46 directors. In this graph companies are 
only displayed if they are connected to each other through actors having positions at their boards; 
in other words, this shows the corporate meeting places of the ‘big oil linkers’.11
A distinction is made between executive and non-executive directors, given their very different 
relations to the company. Executives are much more closely involved in the day-to-day strategy 
and operations of the company, whereas non-executives have a more distant, monitoring, advisory 
relation to the company. Although most of the ‘big oil linkers’ have a non-executive position at 
Figure 4. Corporate meeting places of the ‘big oil linkers’ 2007.
Key: Squares: companies; grey squares: financial companies; circles: actors; black circles: executive director; white circles: 
non-executive director; node size: degree.
Sources: Annual Reports of the connected companies, SEC filings, Orbis (Bureau van Dijk), Lexis Nexis.
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their oil company, some prominent oil executives are part of this circle of ‘big oil linkers’, such as 
Shell’s CEO Van der Veer, Saudi Aramco’s President and CEO Jum’ah, and BP’s Chairman 
Sutherland.12 Moreover, it should be noted that most of these ‘big oil linkers’, even if they are not 
executives on the board of one of the major oil companies, do have at least one executive position 
in another company connected to this network.
The major oil companies in this network are all indirectly connected through at least one direc-
tor sharing a board membership at an intermediate company. There are even three (indirect) con-
nections between Royal Dutch Shell and BP, and they have one executive each at the board of 
Unilever, which seems to suggest a strong connection and exchange of influence between the 
boards of these British/Dutch companies. Total reveals the most extensive and strong ties, with as 
many as four executives and a total of 13 directors establishing interlocking directorates, constitut-
ing what seems to be a quite cohesive French-Belgium cluster. BP, however, has the most (indirect) 
connections to the other IOCs and NOCs. In fact BP is (indirectly) connected to all other oil com-
panies within this component, except Total, and is the only IOC (indirectly) connected to both 
Gazprom and Saudi Aramco.
If we look at the ‘geodesic distances’ (that is, the shortest paths between two actors) in this 
graph, it is interesting to see that Saudi Aramco directors are much ‘closer’ to the other IOCs in this 
sample than Gazprom directors; the former is only two steps away from BP and Chevron and three 
steps from Shell, whereas Gazprom is two steps away from BP as well, but four steps away from 
all the other oil companies and even six steps away from Total. Of all the IOCs, BP clearly has the 
most close connections – in terms of geodesic distance – to the other oil companies in the network; 
with the exception of Total it is only two steps distant from all other companies.13
In general this group of ‘big oil linkers’ – aside from the national networks that they establish – 
are collectively spanning a transnational network including a selection of the world’s major TNCs, 
and global financial players. Apart from other petroleum companies (such as GDF Suez, Motiva 
Enterprises) and major extractive industry firms (e.g. Rio Tinto, Anglo American) a selection of the 
world’ s key TNCs are connected to this network, such as: Unilever, Vodafone, IBM, Northrop 
Grumman, Rolls Royce Group, Coca Cola, General Electric and Alcatel-Lucent. Also some of the 
global financial giants are connected to this network, such as Goldman Sachs, Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS), J.P. Morgan Chase, Société General, Banque de France, AXA Finance and Groupe 
Bruxelles Lambert (GBL). These ‘big oil linkers’ thus form a transnational network of corporate 
meeting places that provides them with a platform for information sharing, exchange of ideas and 
views and coordination of interests, not only amongst each other, but also with a broader transna-
tional corporate community (see, with respect to the latter, also the findings in Carroll, 2010). But 
who are these ‘big oil linkers’ and how are they positioned within the broader network?
Figure 5 shows a one-mode network of all the interlocking directors (a total of 94, see Figure 
2b), that is, those directors that make up the ‘inner circle’ of the oil elite (Useem, 1984).14 Inner 
circle directors with a ‘broker’ position15 are labelled and those with an executive position at one 
of the major oil companies within our selection are coloured grey. Thus, the graph in Figure 5 
immediately reveals that some of the major executives of the selected oil companies have impor-
tant broker positions within this inner circle. The size of the nodes expresses the number of board 
memberships per director. In SNA this is called the ‘degree’ of an actor and it is seen as a measure 
of centrality, indicating the extent of access and potential influence and opportunities of an actor, 
that is, ‘access power’ (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009). The Total directors have the highest degree, all 
range between 17 and 12, while the other oil company directors all have a degree between 9 and 3.
Summarizing the findings above, it can be concluded that a substantial part of the oil elites (46 
out of 182) are embedded into a wider corporate elite network interlocking some of the world’s 
largest TNCs in several core industries (extractive industries, car industry, defence, technology) 
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and link key players of global financial capital with the selected major oil companies. They hold 
between 17 and three corporate board memberships simultaneously, with often at least one execu-
tive function. This pattern, however, applies almost exclusively to the Western oil elites. The 
Southern oil elites emerge as four separate components, of which only Gazprom and Saudi Aramco 
are (indirectly) connected to the Western corporate network. Gazprom, however, has only one con-
nection, and two out of the three connections of Saudi Aramco are established by Western direc-
tors. Some of these Southern oil elites (e.g. Jum’ah and Fedorov) however have important and 
influential broker positions and hence provide potentially crucial bridging positions between the 
West and the South. However, in the case of CNPC, PetroChina, NIOC and PDVSA there are no 
connections at all to the corporate networks established by the other oil company directors.
It can be concluded that, as of yet, there has been very little integration on the part of the 
Southern oil elites into wider transnational corporate elite networks or business communities 
through interlocking directorates. These findings also indicate that the Southern oil elites have very 
little access to these transnational corporate networks and potentially little influence. Moreover, 
the data seem to imply significantly less basis for – and occurrence of – joint formulation and 
coordination of wider corporate interests at a transnational level by Southern oil elites. In the next 
subsection it will be assessed to what extent and how oil elite formation and integration has taken 
place beyond the realm of corporate boards.
Policy planning networks
From the total of 182 oil company directors only 26 turned out to have affiliations with 28 different 
transnational policy planning organizations in 2007, which are shown in the graph in Figure 6.16
Figure 5. Oil elites inner circle.
Key: Labelled squares: broker position; grey squares: executive directors.
Note: The directors in the disconnected Chinese subgroup (middle below) and Mendoza, a PDVSA director, (upper left), 
are also labelled for reasons of identification.
Sources: Annual reports of the connected companies, SEC filings, Orbis (Bureau van Dijk), Lexis Nexis.
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Amongst them there is a near complete absence of Southern transnational organizations, directors and 
ties. We find a clear Western cluster of transnational ties between mostly IOC directors and transnational 
planning and regulatory bodies, with the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT), the World Economic 
Forum (WEF), the Bilderberg Group at its core and connected to these: for example, the Trilateral 
Commission, the Global Business Coalition Against Aids/HIV, the US-Russia Business Council, the 
International Accounting Standards Foundation (IASF), and some UN organizations. It should be noted 
that there is a wide variety of aims and means amongst the included organizations and that they cannot be 
simply compared. Clearly, there is a difference between the ERT or the WEF and, for instance, UN organi-
zations or the IASF. When adopting the definition of transnational policy planning bodies, however, this 
was deliberately defined quite broadly and inclusively (see above), because it aims to include all sorts of 
formal and informal socializing  platforms where business coordination of some kind is assumed to take place.
Big linkers in this network are Sutherland (Chairman BP); Moody-Stuart (Saudi Aramco direc-
tor and previously director at Shell); Collomb (Total); Ollila (Shell) and Robertson (Chevron), i.e. 
all Western directors. The only Southern directors connected to this component are Al-Khayyal 
and Jum’ah (Saudi Aramco), Al-Khayyal as a participant of WEF in 2007 and Jum’ah as member 
of the WEF International Business Council.17 The other two NOC board members that are con-
nected to this component: Sir Moody-Stuart (Saudi Aramco) and Bernabe (PetroChina), are both 
Western. These actors are, however, important brokers between this transnational Western network 
and the Southern elites. Another actor providing such a possible ‘bridge’ is Al-Assaf (Saudi 
Aramco) who is Governor for Saudi Arabia in both the IMF and the World Bank Group. They are 
few, however, and they almost all point to a connection to Saudi Aramco, which might not be sur-
prising given the long-time close alliance between that company and the West, especially with the 
US. Figure 7 shows how these oil elites are connected to each other through these bodies.
Figure 7. Oil elite connections through transnational policy planning organizations.
Key: Black squares: executives; node size: degree.
Note: Isolates in the upper left corner are oil company directors who are affiliated with transnational planning 
organizations but not connected to other directors.
Sources: Annual reports of the connected companies, SEC filings, Orbis (Bureau van Dijk), Lexis Nexis.
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An interesting aspect revealed by the graph in Figure 7 is that half of the directors connected 
through this transnational network have executive positions, in fact, seven of them at the level of 
CEO and/or Chairman. These findings indicate that a significant number of the key oil executives 
from the world’s major IOCs and from Saudi Aramco are closely connected through a transnational 
network constituted by what in the literature is recognized as some of the most central and influen-
tial transnational bodies critical to the formation and formulation of transnational capital and capi-
talist class interests and strategies (see e.g. Carroll, 2010; Gill, 1990; Van Apeldoorn, 2002; Van der 
Pijl, 1984). The fact that they are connected to and through these bodies suggests an exchange of 
views, ideas and information and a coordination of interests. These might not be the particular 
interests of the oil companies that they represent, but rather – as is often suggested – a broader 
business community interest. This is confirmed by the fact that indeed, many of the ‘institutional 
big linkers’ are also ‘corporate big linkers’, most of them with brokerage positions within the cor-
porate ‘inner circle’ (see Figure 6).
Even more significant is the finding that the Southern oil elites have very few connections to 
this broader transnational network (although for some of these organizations, such as the ERT and 
the Trilateral Commission, this is of course rather logical). Apparently, at this level of elite coop-
eration, the Southern oil elites do not yet participate and integrate – except for some Saudi Aramco 
directors – nor do they form any alternative transnational networks themselves. But this does not 
preclude the possibility that the Southern elites might have other meeting places and networks that 
they use for a broader exchange of views and ideas and a coordination of corporate interests. One 
domain that stands out in this respect is the state, to which the analysis turns next.
State–business relations of the oil elites
In order to assess the relation between the oil elites and the state, all state affiliations of the NOC 
and IOC board members were mapped. Included also were political affiliations (i.e. political activi-
ties that did not involve formal positions within the state apparatus) and military affiliations. The 
results for 2007 are shown in Table 2.
In 2007 six IOC directors turned out to have simultaneous engagement at the state level (a total 
of seven interlocks). The major NOCs in this selection, however, had 27 directors simultaneously 
Table 2. State positions of the oil elites in 2007
Total positions State Political Military N directors
Saudi Aramco 22 21 0 1 6
PetroChina 8 5 3 0 7
PDVSA 6 4 0 2 5
Gazprom 4 4 0 0 4
NIOC 3 3 0 0 3
CNPC 3 1 2 0 2
Total 2 2 0 0 2
Royal Dutch Shell 2 2 0 0 2
Exxon Mobil 2 2 0 1
BP 1 1 0 0 1
Chevron 0 0 0 0 0
Sources: Annual reports of the connected companies, SEC filings, Orbis (Bureau van Dijk), Lexis Nexis.
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at positions at state level (a total of 46 state interlocks), pointing to a much more direct and exten-
sive set of relations. Moreover, when the actual positions that the interlocking directors inhabited 
are taken into account, it shows that in the case of the IOC directors, the simultaneous positions 
only involved advisory positions within state bodies (an overview of all 2007 state positions can be 
found in Appendix Table 4). In the case of the NOCs, however, the directors had high-ranked state 
positions, often even at a ministerial or vice-ministerial level. PDVSA directors were for instance 
simultaneously ‘Minister of Popular Power for Energy and Oil’; Gazprom directors were also 
‘Minister of Petroleum’. NIOCs directors held positions as ‘Minister for Economic Development 
and Trade’ and ‘First Deputy Prime Minister’, and Saudi Aramco’s directors had positions ranking 
from ‘Minister of Petroleum and Natural Resources’ to ‘Secretary General of the Supreme 
Economic Council’. The state in these cases, therefore, is not only the ultimate owner of the corpo-
ration, but the actors in charge of these majors are moreover themselves state executives at often 
high-level positions. This confirms that the Southern oil elites are also very explicitly ‘statist’ 
elites, whereas the Western oil elite members have more indirect connections to the state: while 
they do advise states on policy, they operate more ‘independently’ from them.18
Conclusion
This article set out to provide a better understanding and empirical underpinning of the organiza-
tion of social power at the commanding heights of the oil sector in light of the wider transformation 
that is taking place in the global oil market due to the rising powers from the Global South, in 
particular the expansion and integration of the Southern state-owned oil companies. This was done 
by analysing the affiliation networks of the directors of the world’s largest National and International 
Oil Companies (NOCs and IOCs) within several domains: corporate networks, policy planning 
networks, and state–business networks. It has been assessed to what extent the directors of the 
world’s major oil companies are integrated into wider elite networks at both a national and at a 
transnational level, and if so, how the Southern oil elites are related to the Western oil elite net-
works, that is, to what extent they have integrated into, or differ from, the circuits of the Western 
corporate elite.
First of all, it is found that in terms of board composition there was very little West–South inte-
gration. No Southern directors were found on Western oil company boards, and only six Western 
directors were present on Southern oil company boards. The practice of interlocking directorates 
was in general much less common within the Southern oil elite, only 13 percent of those directors 
had interlocking ties to other companies. Within the Western oil elite however, this proportion was 
quite high, 39 percent. In terms of a distribution of national and transnational ties, the national ties 
clearly dominated, which confirms the general findings in the literature of a transnational corporate 
superstructure embedded in strong corporate national bases. Nonetheless, 29 percent of all corporate 
ties consisted of transnational linkages; indeed, a substantial number of the Western oil elites – 
involving some of the key executives of the major IOCs – are closely linked to a network of large 
transnational corporations and financial capital. These ‘big oil linkers’ hold between 17 and three 
corporate board memberships simultaneously, with often at least one executive function. This pat-
tern, however, applies almost exclusively to the Western oil elites. In the case of the Southern oil 
elites, transnational ties were nearly absent (4%). Hence very little transnational integration is found 
through corporate connections of Southern oil elites, and almost no integration seems to have taken 
place between the South and the West in this respect. Exceptions are Gazprom and Saudi Aramco 
that do have a few directors at potentially influential bridging positions with ties to the transnational 
corporate network; however, these directors in many cases turned out to be Western directors.
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Also within the domain of policy planning organizations little integration between the Southern 
and Western oil elites is found. A small number of the Western oil elites generate a dominantly 
Western subgroup, with their meeting places being some well-known transnational bodies – such as 
the ERT, the WEF, the Bilderberg Group and the Trilateral Commission – that are core platforms for 
the organization of the wider transnational business community. The Southern oil elites of the major 
NOCs are however hardly connected to this transnational network – with again the exception of 
Saudi Aramco – and do not form transnational policy planning networks themselves.
When looking at differences between the Southern and Western oil elites in terms of state 
affiliations it was confirmed that the former is a ‘statist elite’ par excellence, with the NOC direc-
tors holding high profile state positions, often at ministerial or vice ministerial level, whereas the 
Western oil elites demonstrate a more indirect pattern of state involvement, confirming the 
‘revolving door mechanism’, and in the actual cases of an overlap, the predominance of advisory 
positions at state level.
Overall, this analysis makes clear that the differences between the Western and Southern oil 
elites are still very large in terms of the relational patterns analysed, that is, the practice of inter-
locking directorates, affiliations with transnational policy planning bodies and their affiliations 
with the state. Whereas the Western oil elites inhabit a core place within a global or transnational 
corporate elite, as they interlink not only with powerful transnational capital groups but also with 
central transnational policy planning networks and have an advisory relation to the state and state 
policy, the Southern oil elites are barely connected to these Western corporate and civil society 
networks and do not form any similar alternative networks themselves. Instead the Southern oil 
elites ‘state–business relations’ indicate very distinct forms of elite cooperation, intimately related 
to the state apparatus, in fact, holding simultaneously high executive positions within the state and 
the major NOCs.
The Southern oil elites thus still seem to have little access to and influence within the typical 
Western elite and business circuits. Yet, it remains an open question whether this is the case because 
Southern elites are not allowed access, or whether they do not want access and prefer to develop 
alternative power structures. It might indeed be the case that the Western elite power structures are 
becoming less attractive and perhaps less influential themselves.
In sum, these results make clear that whereas the Southern oil elites are increasingly active 
within the West in terms of business activity, and are directing a major expansion of their 
NOCs – which at the same time generates increased cooperation with Western private oil 
majors – these developments have not yet led to South–West integration at the level of elite 
formation. While it is impossible to predict what the precise direction of these developments 
will be, it does seem to imply a transition towards a more multi-polar oil order, no longer 
structured by a Western ‘core’ dominating the Southern ‘periphery’, including more hybrid 
forms of cooperation and coalitions of interests, and a possible diffusion of corporate and 
elite power at the global level.
To what extent this transition towards multi-polarity will fundamentally challenge the liberal 
market-based constitution of the current oil order is questionable. It might well be that the ris-
ing Southern elites will largely adapt to its ‘rules of the game’, that is, a deepening of capitalist 
discipline and neoliberal market mechanisms; but it might also lead to a re-definition of the role 
of the state and its relation to capital. Irrespective of that, however, there is a geopolitical 
dimension to this development given by the fact that the global political economy is still spa-
tially divided by territorially defined states. Indeed, in spite of increased cooperation and inte-
gration at the corporate level and the existence of a Western transnational oil elite network, the 
national oil elites and corporate networks persist, as confirmed by this study. Even in a scenario 
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of increasing levels of transnational integration and with the Southern oil elites largely adapting 
to the liberal market based ‘rules of the game’, a more multi-polar oil order will hold the poten-
tial of geopolitical conflict, not only because such a transformation might challenge the 
dominance of the West, but also because this is inherent in a global oil order constituted by 
territorially defined sovereign states.
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Appendix: Oil elite networks in a transforming global oil market
Appendix Table 1. Overview positions in global and transnational organizations 2007 – selection of oil 
elites
Name Oil company Global or transnational organization Function
Al-Assaf Saudi Aramco World Bank Group Governor for Saudi Arabia
 IMF Governor for Saudi Arabia
Al-Khayyal Saudi Aramco World Economic Forum Participant
Bernabe PetroChina European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) Member
Collomb Total International Accounting Standards 
Foundation (IASF)
Trustee
 European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) Member
 Global Business Coalition Against HIV/Aids Vice Chairman
Jum’ah Saudi Aramco World Economic Forum – International 
Business Council
Energy Community Leader
Moody-Stuart Saudi Aramco UN Global Compact Foundation Director
 Global Business Coalition Against HIV/Aids Co-Chairman
 World Economic Forum Member Steering 
committee Responsible 
for Driving the Global 
Governance
 Global Reporting Initiative Director
O’Reilly Chevron World Economic Forum – International 
Business Council
Director
Robertson Chevron US-Russia Business Council Director
 Global Business Coalition Against HIV/Aids Director
 US-Arabian Business Council Director
Sutherland BP Bilderberg Group Steering Committee
 UN Special Representative for Migration and 
Development
Special Representative
(Continued)
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Appendix Table 2. State affiliations oil elites, including historical positions
Total State Political Mil N
BP 1 1 0 0 1
NIOC 3 3 0 0 3
Exxon Mobil 2 2 0 1
PDVSA 6 4 2 0 5
Total 2 2 0 0 2
Royal Dutch Shell 2 2 0 0 2
Chevron 20 9 10 1 7
Saudi Aramco 22 21 0 1 6
PetroChina 8 5 3 0 7
CNPC 3 1 2 0 2
Gazprom 4 4 0 0 4
Name Oil company Global or transnational organization Function
 European Commission Member Advisory Group 
President Barrosso energy 
& climate change
 World Economic Forum Member Foundation 
Board
 Trilateral Commission Chairman Europe
 European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) Vice Chairman
Appendix Table 3. Examples of ‘revolving door’ biographies
IOC Director Selection of former positions, state and business
Lord Levene
Director of Total (2003–2008)
Lord Mayor of London (1998–1999), Advisor to the Prime Minister 
(1992–1997), Permanent Secretary Chief of Defence Procurement 
(1981–1987), Vice Chairman Deutsche Bank UK (1999–2001), Senior 
Advisor Morgan Stanley (1996–1998), Chairman Lloyds (2002–2007) 
and General Dynamics UK (2001–2008), and Director China 
Construction Bank (2006–2007)
John Kerr
Director of Royal Dutch Shell 
(since 2004)
UK Permanent Representative to the EU (1990–1995), British 
Ambassador to the USA (1995–1997), Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office Permanent Under Secretary of State (1997–2002), Secretary 
General EU Constitutional Treaty Convention (2002–2003), and non-
executive director at both Rio Tinto plc (2003–2007) and Scottish 
American Investment Company (since 2002)
Wim Kok
Director of Royal Dutch Shell 
(2003–2011)
Prime Minister of the Netherlands (1994–2002), Minister of Finance 
(1989–1993), Member of the Lower House of Parliament and 
parliamentary leader of the Labour Party (1986–1998), Supervisor at 
Royal Dutch Petroleum (2003–2005) and at KLM, TNT and Stork NV
Appendix Table 1. (Continued)
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Appendix Table 4. Overview state position of oil elites 2007
Oil company Name State affiliation
BP Massey Member of President Bush’s Council of Advisors 
on Science and Technology
CNPC Jiang J. 17th CPC Central Committee, Alternate Member
CNPC Li X. Yunnan Province Vice Governor (since 2002 
Assistant Governor)
Exxon Mobil Boskin Commerce Department, Advisory Comm. 
National Income & Product Accounts, Member 
Congressional Budget Office Panel of Advisors
Gazprom Gref Minister for Economic Development and Trade
Gazprom Khristenko Minister for Industry and Energy
Gazprom Medvedev First Deputy Prime Minister
Gazprom Yusufov Special Repr. of the President for Intern Energy 
Coop., Special Envoy Ministry Foreign Affairs
NIOC Bakhshian Deputy Minister of Human Resources, Ministry of 
Petroleum
NIOC Jashnsaz Deputy Oil Minister
NIOC Nozari Minister of Petroleum (or Oil Minister)
PDVSA Carreno Minister of Popular Power for Energy and Oil
PDSVA Mendoza General of the Venezuelan Armed Forces; Council 
of Defense Secretary; Dir. Office President
PDVSA Mommer Vice Minister of Hydrocarbons
PDVSA Orellana Executive Assistant to the Minister of Popular 
Power for Energy and Oil
 Ministry of Popular Power for Energy and Oil; 
Director General of Hydrocarbons
PDVSA Rodriguez General of the Venezuelan Armed Forces
PetroChina Gong Accountant Standard Committee under Ministry 
of Finance – Member
PetroChina Jiang F. 17th CPC Central Committee – Alternate 
Member
PetroChina Li H. Tenth Chinese People’s Consultative Conference 
– Standing member
PetroChina Li Y. Deputy Director Liaison Office of the Central 
Government, Region of Macau
PetroChina Liu Subcomm. for Economic Affairs of the National 
Comm. of the Chinese People – Vice Chair
PetroChina Wu Supreme People’s Court of China, Expert 
consultant
PetroChina Zheng Counselor of the State Council
Royal Dutch Shell Kerr House of the Lords (UK) Independent Member 
and EU select Committee
Royal Dutch Shell Voser Swiss Federal Auditor Oversight Authority
Saudi Aramco Al-Assaf Minister of Finance
 Higher Advisory Council for Petroleum and 
Minerals Member
 Manpower Council – Member
(Continued)
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Oil company Name State affiliation
 Public Investments Fund – Chairman
 The Saudi Fund for Development – Chairman
 Civil Service Council – Member
 Higher Council for Civil Defence – Member
 Supreme Economic Council, Member and Vice 
Chairman of its Standing Committee
 General Investment Authority
 Supreme Commission for Tourism – Board 
member
 Council of Civil Service Member
 Military Service Council – Member
 Higher Committee for Administrative Reform – 
Vice Chairman
 Real Estate Development Fund – Chairman
 Pension and Retirement Fund – Chairman
Saudi Aramco Al-Naimi Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources
Saudi Aramco Al-Suwaiyel Governor of the Communications and Information 
Technology Commission KACST
 President of KACST, holding rank of a Minister 
from 1 July 2007
Saudi Aramco Al-
Tuwaijiri
Supreme Economic Council (chaired by King 
Abdullah) – Secretary-General
Saudi Aramco Jum’ah Member Supreme Committee of KACST
 Director Saudi Arabian Supreme Council of 
Petroleum and Mineral Affairs
Total Desmarais Economic Consultative Council Member (directed 
by Minister Flaherty)
Total Levene House of Lords Select Committee for Economic 
Affairs – Member
Sources: Annual reports of the connected companies, SEC filings, Orbis (Bureau van Dijk), Lexis Nexis.
Notes
1. The Global South generally refers to countries in Africa, Central and Latin American, the Middle East 
and Asia. In this article it is used to refer to a heterogeneous group of states that are elsewhere also 
labelled ‘emerging economies/markets’, non-OECD countries, or the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China), and to distinguish them from the West, which in this case refers to the US and Western Europe. 
It should be noted however that geographically this terminology is not entirely correct because in the 
case of the oil sector Russia should be (and is) included although it is not a Southern state; moreover, the 
general term Global South refers mostly to economically vulnerable states with few resources, whereas 
the subject of this article is increasingly powerful states within these regions that are challenging Western 
dominance. In spite of these limitations, the distinction of the West vis-à-vis the Global South will be 
maintained within this study for lack of a better alternative and to avoid increasing the conceptual confu-
sion by adding yet another terminology.
2. The following countries had a GDP in 2009 that was above the combined total revenue of Exxon Mobil, BP, 
Shell, Total, Conoco Phillips and Chevron: USA 14.2 trillion, Japan 5 trillion, China 4.9 trillion, Germany 3.3 
Appendix Table 4. (Continued)
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trillion, France 2.6 trillion, UK 2.2 trillion, Italy 2.1 trillion (The World Bank: World Development Indicators 
Database 2009, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf).
 3. Although often used interchangeably there is an important distinction between ‘class’ and ‘elite’, the 
most essential difference being that class entails the fundamentally conflicting relation between capital 
and labour rooted in (private) property relations. According to Carroll (2009), the corporate elite entails 
the top tier of the capitalist class; the analysis of corporate elites thus would shed light on the top tier of 
its organization.
 4. Interlocking directorates are linkages among corporations created by individuals who sit on two or more 
corporate boards.
 5. It should be noted that these are indicators of potential influence and power; actual power and the way 
it is exercised ultimately depends on the nature of the node, the kind of tie and so forth. Although there 
is ample literature on basic power structures that can be identified within networks, as well as theories 
on the power dynamics that can be derived from these structures (see also Borgatti and Foster, 2003; 
Fennema and Schijf, 1979; Scott, 1991b), there is also severe criticism of these kind of network studies. 
Pettigrew (1992), in particular, criticizes the focus on structural properties of the networks and suggests 
to instead analyse the content of the ties, their development and use.
 6. It should be noted that the terms ‘national’ and ‘international oil companies’ have several shortcomings: 
1) in spite of their name their core business also includes other forms of hydrocarbons, such as gas; 2) 
the major IOCs and NOCs are to a very large extent essentially transnational corporations; 3) the term 
‘national oil company’ is used to denote both fully state-owned as well as partly state-owned oil com-
panies such as Gazprom. In spite of these shortcomings the usage of these terms will be maintained in 
this article since these are the most commonly used and known in the literature. Although it would be a 
worthwhile endeavour to provide a more apt terminology and conceptualization of these different types 
of companies, the main focus of this article is on the actors in charge of these different types of compa-
nies and not an investigation into the corporate structure of the companies themselves.
 7. PetroChina’s board is included – in spite of it being majority owned by CNPC (86% of the shares) and 
showing substantial overlap in terms of board membership – because of the size and importance of the 
firm, which is publicly listed. Since 2008 it has been the world’s number two in terms of market capitali-
zation, under Exxon Mobil (Financial Times Global 500, http://media.ft.com/cms/eee5847a-9085-11dd-
8abb-0000779fd18c.pdf).
 8. The nationality of the directors was taken to define whether they belong to the West or the South.
 9. A national corporate tie in this case means that an oil company director sits on another board of his own 
nationality, whereas a transnational corporate tie means that an oil company director sits on another 
board of a different nationality than his own.
10. In SNA terms this is a ‘one-mode network’ transposed from the ‘two-mode network’. A ‘two mode 
network’ includes both the actors (in this case IOC and NOC board members in 2007) and what is 
in SNA parlance is called the ‘events’ (in this case the interlocks that they form through positions at 
other boards). In a transposed ‘one mode network’, the nodes represent only the actors (or the ‘events’), 
whereas the lines between the nodes represent the connecting ‘events’ (or the actors).
11. Other companies to which these directors are connected are hence not displayed. The size of the nodes 
however does reflect the total number of ties, and thus still gives an impression of the overall ‘degree’ of 
the actors and companies.
12. The latter is included – although he is a non-executive Chairman – because of the senior and influential 
role in terms of corporate management of the non-executive chairman in the British corporate govern-
ance system.
13. The author would like to thank Roy Barnes for highlighting this point.
14. Useem defined as the ‘inner circle’ those directors that serve at two or more large corporate boards (1984: 
64).
15. Being a ‘broker’, that is the only connection between two subgroups of the network, potentially gives an 
actor particular influence, because it gives privileged access to a subgroup to which other actors are not 
connected (e.g. Granovetter, 1973).
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16. It should, however, be noted that the affiliations were mapped on the basis of public reports and docu-
ments, and not on the basis of self-reporting, the number of affiliations hence might be larger in reality.
17. For a full overview of the positions of the big linkers, see Appendix Table 1.
18. The fact that there is such an indirect relation in terms of interlocks between the state and the major oil 
company directors within the West was confirmed when the ‘revolving door’ mechanism (i.e. a persistent 
pattern of state positions interchanged with corporate positions) was taken into account, by including 
historical positions. This increased the number of the IOC directors with position(s) at state level at 
some time in their career to 25, with a total of 61 statist interlocks. For the NOC directors it brought their 
numbers to 62, establishing a total of 142 statist interlocks (for an overview of the historical positions 
and revolving door biographies, see Appendix Tables 2 and 3).
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